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Abstract: In some socio-economic surveys, data are collected on sensitive or stigmatizing issues
such as tax evasion, criminal conviction, drug use, etc. In such surveys, direct questioning of
respondents is not of much use and the randomized response technique is used instead. A few
researchers have studied the issue of privacy protection or respondent jeopardy for surveys on
dichotomous populations, where the objective is to estimate the proportion of persons bearing
the sensitive trait. However, not much is yet known about respondent protection when the vari-
able under study takes discrete numerical values and the objective of the survey is to estimate
the population mean of this variable. In this article we study this issue. We first propose a
randomization device for this situation and give the corresponding estimation procedure. We
next propose a measure of privacy and show that given a certain stipulated level of this privacy
measure, we can determine the parameter of the randomization device so as to maximize the
efficiency of estimation, while guaranteeing the desired level of privacy protection. In particular,
our study also covers the case of polychotomous populations and we can estimate the propor-
tions of individuals belonging to the different classes. Consequently, results for dichotomous
populations follow as corollaries.
Keywords: Jeopardy measure, numerical stigmatizing variable, revealing probability.
1 Introduction
The randomized response technique is a useful method for collecting data on variables which
are considered sensitive, incriminating or stigmatizing for the respondents. Examples of such
situations are common in socio-economic surveys, for instance, we may need to collect data on
tax evasion, alcohol addiction, illegal drug use, criminal behaviour or past criminal convictions.
In such surveys, direct questions are not useful as the respondents will either refuse to answer
embarrassing questions or, even if they do, may give false answers. In a randomized response
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model, the respondents use a randomization device to generate a randomized response and the
parameter under study can be estimated from these responses. So, the respondent is not required
to disclose his true response and it is expected that this will lead to better participation in the
survey on sensitive issues.
Warner (1965) introduced the randomized response technique for estimating the proportion
of persons bearing a sensitive attribute in a dichotomous population. In Warner’s model, with
population categories A and Ac, a box with two types of cards labeled A and Ac (in proportion
p : 1 − p) is used as the randomization device. A respondent draws a card at random and
responds ‘yes’ or ‘no’ according as whether or not he belongs to the card type he draws. Since
then, several researchers have extensively contributed to this area, e.g., Kuk (1990), Ljungqvist
(1993), Mangat (1994), Chua and Tsui (2000), Van den Hout and Van der Heijden (2002),
Christofides (2005) and many others. For details on the results available on this technique we
refer to the review paper by Chaudhuri and Mukerjee (1987) and books by Chaudhuri and
Mukerjee (1988) and Chaudhuri (2011).
Lanke (1976) and Leysieffer and Warner (1976) initiated the study of efficiency versus privacy
protection in randomized response surveys where the population is divided into two complemen-
tary sensitive groups, A and Ac, and the objective is to estimate the proportions of persons
belonging to these groups. They suggested measures of jeopardy based on the ‘revealing prob-
abilities’, i.e., the posterior probabilities of a respondent belonging to groups A and Ac given
his randomized response. Since then, this dichotomous case has been widely studied. Loynes
(1976) extended the jeopardy measure of Leysieffer and Warner (1976) to polychotomous pop-
ulations. Ljungqvist (1993) gave a unified and utilitarian approach to measures of privacy for
the dichotomous case. Nayak and Adeshiyan (2009) proposed a measure of jeopardy for surveys
from dichotomous populations and developed an approach for comparing the available random-
ization procedures. These results are all based on samples drawn by simple random sampling
with replacement.
All the references given above are for sensitive variables which are categorial or qualitative
in nature. However, in randomized response surveys it is quite common to have situations where
the study variable X is quantitative, e.g. in studies on the number of criminal convictions of
a person, the number of induced abortions, the number of months spent in a correction centre,
the amount of undisclosed income, etc. Anderson (1977) studied the case of continuous sensitive
variables and considered the amount of information provided by the randomized responses. For
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ensuring more privacy he recommended that the expectation of the conditional variance of X
given the randomized response be made as large as possible. However, not much work seems to
have been done in studying the respondent privacy aspect for discrete-valued sensitive variables,
even though surveys are often undertaken on such variables.
To fill this gap, in this article we focus on studying the issue of privacy protection when
the underlying variable under study is quantitative and discrete. We propose the use of a
randomization device and give the associated estimation method. Then, we consider two separate
cases, one where all values of X are sensitive and another where not all values of X are sensitive.
For each of these cases, we propose a measure for protecting the privacy of the respondents. We
finally show how one can choose the randomization device parameter in each case, so as to
guarantee a certain pre-specified level of respondent protection and then maximize the efficiency
of estimating the parameter of interest under this constraint. Our study also covers qualitative
sensitive variables, i.e., cases where the population is dichotomous or polychotomous, and allows
us to estimate the proportions of individuals belonging to each category.
In Section 2 we give some preliminaries. In Sections 3 and 4 we consider the issues of esti-
mation and privacy protection, respectively. In Section 5 we obtain the randomization device
parameter which allows efficient estimation while assuring the required level of respondent pro-
tection and illustrate with some numerical examples. In the concluding section we show how
our study covers the case of polychotomous variables.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a population with N individuals labeled 1, . . . , N . Let X denote the sensitive variable
of interest. We assume that X takes a finite number of values x1, . . . , xm and without loss of
generality, we may suppose these m values to be known. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let pii be the unknown
population proportion of individuals for whom X equals xi, i.e.,
Prob(X = xi) = pii, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where pii ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
pii = 1, (1)
The objective of the survey is to estimate the population mean of X. For this, we suppose
as usual (cf. Warner (1965), Nayak and Adeshiyan (2009) and others), that a sample of n
individuals is drawn from the population by simple random sampling with replacement. As for
the randomization device, since we are interested in the numerical values of X, we propose the
use of a device as described below.
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Consider a box containing cards of (m+1) types, the ith type of card being marked ‘Report
xi as your response’, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, while the (m+ 1)th type of card is marked: ‘Report your true
value of X as your response.’ The box has a large number of cards, say M , there being Mp
cards of type (m+ 1) and M 1−p
m
cards of each of the types i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 < p < 1. A sampled
respondent is asked to draw a card at random from the box and then give a truthful response
according to the card drawn by him, without disclosing the label on the card to the investigator.
Thus the true value of X for the respondent is not known. The n responses so received are the
data from this survey.
Let R denote the randomized response variable. Clearly, with this device, the ranges of
R and X match. The efficiency in estimation and respondent protection will depend on the
choice of the value of p, which we call the device parameter. The above device is such that with
probability p, a respondent will report his true value, while with probability 1−p
m
, he will report
any one of the possible values x1, . . . , xm chosen at random, i.e.,
Prob(R = xi|X = xj) =
1− p
m
, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m, (2)
Prob(R = xj|X = xj) = p+
1− p
m
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. (3)
3 Estimation of population mean
The population mean and variance of X are given by
µX =
m∑
i=1
xipii and σ
2
X =
m∑
i=1
(xi − µX)
2pii,
respectively. Our objective is to estimate µX from the n randomized responses collected as
described in Section 2. Let wi be the sample proportion of randomized responses which equal
xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence, from (1)–(3),
E(wi) = Prob(R = xi) = ppii +
1− p
m
= λi, say. (4)
So, an unbiased estimator of pii will be given by pˆii =
1
p
(wi −
1−p
m
), leading to an unbiased
estimator of µX as
µˆX =
m∑
i=1
xipˆii =
1
p
m∑
i=1
xiwi −
1− p
mp
m∑
i=1
xi.
Then, on simplification using (4), and writing X¯ = 1
m
∑m
i=1 xi, the variance of µˆX is given by
Var(µˆX) =
1
p2
Var(
m∑
i=1
xiwi) =
1
np2


m∑
i=1
x2iλi(1− λi)−
∑ m∑
i 6=j=1
xixjλiλj


4
=
1
np2
{
p
m∑
i=1
x2ipii +
1− p
m
m∑
i=1
x2i −
(
pµX + (1− p)X¯
)2}
=
1
np2
{
pσ2X + (1− p)
1
m
m∑
i=1
(xi − X¯)
2 + p(p− 1)(µX − X¯)
2
}
. (5)
Our aim is to estimate µX keeping Var(µˆX) as small as possible. It is clear from the expression
on the right side of (5) that Var(µˆX) is decreasing in p, irrespective of the values of pi1, . . . , pim.
So, this variance may be decreased, or equivalently, the efficiency of estimation may be increased
by increasing p, whatever may be the proportions of the xi values in the population.
4 Privacy protection
To study the respondent privacy aspect for dichotomous populations, Leysieffer and Warner
(1976) studied the case where both A and Ac are sensitive categories while Lanke (1975) also
considered the case where only A is sensitive and there is no jeopardy in a ‘no’ answer to the
sensitive question. For polychotomous populations, Loynes (1976) studied two cases, one where
all categories are stigmatizing and another where one of the categories is not stigmatizing. In
line with these, we too consider the privacy issue for two situations, one where all them values of
X are stigmatizing and another where not all values of X are stigmatizing. Both these situations
commonly arise in practice and we require separate privacy protection measures for them.
For a randomly chosen respondent from the population, the ‘true’ probability that the value
of X for this respondent equals xi is given by Prob(X = xi). On the other hand, when this
respondent gives a randomized response, say xj , then the probability that the value of X for
this respondent equals xi is now given by the conditional probability Prob(X = xi|R = xj), or
the ‘revealing’ probability.
4.1 All values of X are stigmatizing
Suppose all the values x1, . . . , xm are stigmatizing. In this case, a respondent would feel com-
fortable in participating in the survey if the perception of his having a value X = xi is not much
altered after knowing his randomized response, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. This would require that his
true and revealing probabilities be sufficiently close. Starting from this basic premise we define
αij = |Prob(X = xi|R = xj)− Prob(X = xi)| (6)
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and since each respondent would want αij to be as small as possible for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, as a
measure of privacy protection we propose the following measure:
α = max
1≤i,j≤m
αij . (7)
A randomization device with a privacy protection value α = α0 would guarantee that the
discrepancies between the true and revealing probabilities will be at most α0 for all respondents,
irrespective of their true values. Thus a device which results in a lower value of α gives a higher
level of privacy protection than one with a higher value of α.
Suppose the scientist planning a certain survey would like to keep the privacy protection
available to respondents above a certain threshold, i.e., would like to achieve α ≤ ξ, where ξ is
a pre-assigned quantity, 0 < ξ < 1. Moreover, this bound on α should hold irrespective of the
unknown values of pi1, . . . , pim. The following theorem shows how the device parameter can be
chosen to achieve this.
Theorem 1. For α as in (7) and a preassigned ξ, where 0 < ξ < 1, α ≤ ξ will hold, irrespective
of the values of pi1, . . . , pim, if and only if p ≤ p0, where
p0 =
1
1 + m
ξ
(1−ξ2 )
2
. (8)
Proof. From (1)-(3), using Bayes’ Theorem it follows that for 1 ≤ i, j,≤ m,
Prob(X = xi|R = xj) =
(pδij +
1−p
m
)pii∑m
u=1(pδju +
1−p
m
)piu
=
(pδij +
1−p
m
)pii
ppij +
1−p
m
, (9)
where δij is Kronecker Delta. Hence from (6) it follows that αij =
ppii|pij−δij |
ppij+
1−p
m
and for any i 6= j,
αij =
ppiipij
ppij +
1−p
m
≤
p(1− pij)pij
ppij +
1−p
m
= αjj, (10)
as pii + pij ≤ 1 for all i, j. Thus α = max
1≤j≤m
αjj = max
1≤j≤m
pij(1−pij)
pij+
1−p
mp
. Hence, α ≤ ξ if and only if
pij(1− pij)− ξpij ≤
ξ(1− p)
mp
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. (11)
First suppose p ≤ p0. Then for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
pij(1− pij)− ξpij =
(
1− ξ
2
)2
−
(
1− ξ
2
− pij
)2
≤
(
1− ξ
2
)2
=
ξ(1− p0)
mp0
, using (8)
≤
ξ(1− p)
mp
.
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Thus the inequalities in (11) hold, or equivalently α ≤ ξ, irrespective of the values of pi1, . . . , pim.
To prove the converse, suppose α ≤ ξ, or equivalently, the inequalities in (11) hold, irrespec-
tive of the values of pi1, . . . , pim. Then, for pi1 =
1−ξ
2 , pi2 =
1+ξ
2 , pi3 = . . . = pim = 0, in particular,
these inequalities will also hold. So, for this choice of pij values in (11) with j = 1, we have
(
1− ξ
2
)(
1 + ξ
2
)
− ξ
(
1− ξ
2
)
≤
ξ(1− p)
mp
i.e.,
(
1− ξ
2
)2
≤
ξ(1− p)
mp
.
So from (8), p ≤ p0. Hence theorem. ✷
Remark 1. It is clear from (8) that in order to maintain the same level of protection, the
value of p0 monotonically decreases with the number of possible values of X. Again, for a given
number of possible values of X, p0 monotonically increases with ξ. We may reiterate that these
values of p do not depend on how the values of X are distributed in the population.
4.2 Not all values of X are stigmatizing
In many surveys it may so happen that not all values of X are sensitive or stigmatizing. For
instance, in a survey for estimating the average number of criminal convictions of persons in a
certain population, the value X = 0 is not stigmatizing but any value of X ≥ 1 could well be
stigmatizing. Similarly, for a survey for estimating the average of the number (X) of induced
abortions, the values X = 0 or X = 1 might not be considered as stigmatizing values while
other larger values might be considered stigmatizing by the respondents.
To study the respondents’ privacy protection for such surveys, we present here the simpler
case where only one of the values of X, say x1, is not stigmatizing, while values x2, . . . , xm are
considered stigmatizing. We develop the protection measure for this case in detail. Later we
remark that the results obtained for this case may be easily extended to the case where X has
more than one non-stigmatizing values.
As before, the data collection and estimation proceeds as in Sections 2 and 3. To study the
respondent protection we note that since the value x1 is non-stigmatizing, respondents will feel
comfortable with a randomization device for which the ‘revealing’ probability of their having a
true value x1 will be large. So, we propose the following measure of privacy:
β = min
1≤j≤m
P (X = x1|R = xj) = min
1≤j≤m
(pδ1j +
1−p
m
)pi1
ppij +
1−p
m
, (12)
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on simplification using (9). A device with a privacy protection value β will guarantee that all
respondents are perceived to have X = x1 with probability at least β. So, a device leading to a
larger value of β will ensure greater privacy to respondents than one with a smaller β.
Let ξ, 0 < ξ < 1, denote a preassigned level of respondents’ privacy. Then in order to achieve
this level of protection we require that β ≥ ξ, irrespective of the values of pi1, . . . , pim. Thus we
should have
(pδ1j +
1− p
m
)pi1 ≥ ξ(ppij +
1− p
m
), 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
or equivalently, the following inequalities should hold:
[p(1− ξ) +
1− p
m
]pi1 ≥
ξ(1− p)
m
(13)
and
1− p
m
pi1 − ξppij ≥
ξ(1− p)
m
, 2 ≤ j ≤ m. (14)
Clearly, no p can satisfy (13) irrespective of pi1, . . . , pim for any given ξ since (13) fails as pi1 → 0.
So we assume that pi1 > 0 and we also assume some prior knowledge about a lower bound on
pi1. This assumption is quite realistic because in most populations there will be an appreciable
number of persons with a non-stigmatizing variable value and hence, a lower bound to the
proportion of such stigma-free persons in the population will be available.
Thus, suppose we have prior knowledge that pi1 ≥ c. We work with ξ < c. This is again
realistic because if the only knowledge about pi1 is that pi1 ≥ c, it is impractical to demand that
P (X = x1|R = xj) ≥ ξ(≥ c) for all j. Now, the following theorem gives the value of the device
parameter p which will guarantee the desired level of respondent protection ξ.
Theorem 2. Let β be as in (12) and pi1 ≥ c for some known c. Then given a preassigned ξ,
where 0 < ξ < c, β ≥ ξ will hold, irrespective of the values of pi1, . . . , pim, if and only if p ≤ p0,
where
p0 =
c−ξ
m
c−ξ
m
+ ξ(1− c)
. (15)
Proof. Since pi1 ≥ c, it is clear that pij ≤ 1− c for 2 ≤ j ≤ m and we have
[p(1− ξ) +
1− p
m
]pi1 ≥ [p(1− ξ) +
1− p
m
]c
and
1− p
m
pi1 − ξppij ≥
1− p
m
c− ξp(1− c), 2 ≤ j ≤ m.
As a result, (13) and (14) will hold, irrespective of the true values of pi1(≥ c), pi2, . . . , pim iff
[p(1− ξ) +
1− p
m
]c ≥ ξ
1− p
m
(16)
and
1− p
m
c− ξp(1− c) ≥ ξ
1− p
m
(17)
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hold. Now, (16) reduces to
(p +
1− p
m
)c ≥ ξ(cp+
1− p
m
)
which will always hold for every p since ξ(cp + 1−p
m
) ≤ ξ(p + 1−p
m
) < c(p + 1−p
m
) as ξ < c and
p+ 1−p
m
> 0. So, it is enough to only consider (17). Note that
(17)⇔
c− cp
m
− ξp(1− c) ≥
ξ − ξp
m
⇔ p ≤ =
c−ξ
m
c−ξ
m
+ ξ(1− c)
= p0,
thus proving the theorem. ✷
Remark. The above discussion can be extended to include the more general case where X
has t non-stigmatizing values x1, . . . , xt, say, while its remaining m− t values are stigmatizing,
1 < t < m. In that case too, it can be shown that p0 takes the form as in Theorem 2, but now
with
β = min1≤j≤mP (X = x1 or x2 or . . . xt|R = xj) and pi1 + . . .+ pit ≥ c with ξ < c.
5 Privacy protection together with efficiency in estimation
We now consider the issue of efficiency in estimation together with privacy protection in ran-
domized response surveys. It was seen from (5) that, irrespective of the values of pi1, . . . , pim,
the efficiency of estimation may be increased by increasing p. On the other hand, for a given ξ
and irrespective of the values of pi1, . . . , pim, Theorems 1 and 2 show that a protection of α ≤ ξ
or β ≥ ξ may be guaranteed iff p ≤ p0, where p0 is as in (8) or (15), respectively. So, the
best choice of p with regard to maximizing the efficiency of estimation of µX , subject to the
stipulated level of privacy protection ξ, is p = p0. The following examples illustrate this.
Example 5.1 Let X take four values which are all sensitive. Suppose ξ = 0.1 Then by Theorem
1, p0 = 0.1099. So, if we use a randomization device with p = 0.1099 then the efficiency of
estimation can be maximized while guaranteeing that the maximum discrepancy between the
true probability and the revealing probability of all respondents will be at most 0.1. ✷
The following table gives the p0 values in (8) for some choices of ξ and m.
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m ξ p0 m ξ p0 m ξ p0
3 0.1 0.1413 4 0.1 0.1099 5 0.1 0.0899
3 0.2 0.2941 4 0.2 0.2381 5 0.2 0.2000
3 0.3 0.4494 4 0.3 0.3797 5 0.3 0.3288
3 0.4 0.5970 4 0.4 0.5263 5 0.4 0.4706
Example 5.2 Let X take one nonsensitive value and two sensitive values. Suppose it can be
assumed that at least 15% of the individuals in the population possess the nonsensitive value
and suppose it is stipulated that ξ = 0.10. Then by Theorem 2, p0 = 0.1639. So, if we use
a device with p = 0.1639 then estimation efficiency will be maximum while guaranteeing that
all respondents will have at least a 10% probability of being revealed as belonging to the non-
stigmatizing class. ✷
6 Estimation of population proportions
As mentioned in Section 1, several researchers have estimated the proportions of individuals
belonging to the two categories in dichotomous populations, while Loynes (1976) extended this
to estimating the different proportions in a polychotomous population. In our case where X
takes m numerical values, we may also readily estimate the population proportions pi1, . . . , pim
from the responses collected as in Section 2 and again use the measures of privacy as given in
(7) and (12) to achieve the stipulated level of privacy protection.
As seen in Section 3, an unbiased estimate of pii is
pˆii =
1
p
(wi −
1− p
m
), 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Suppose, in the spirit of A−optimality commonly used in optimal design theory, we would like
to minimize the average variance of these estimates. For this, we can show that
m∑
i=1
V ar(pii) =
1
np2
m∑
i=1
λi(1− λi) =
1
n
{
1
p2
−
m∑
i=1
pi2i +
1
m
(
1
p2
− 1)
}
, (18)
on simplification, using (4). Clearly, (18) is decreasing in p, irrespective of the true values of
pi1, . . . , pim. So as in the case of estimating the mean, here too, given some ξ, subject to the
constraint on protection of privacy, the best choice for p for minimizing the average variance of
the estimates of the proportions, is p = p0, with p0 being given by (8) or (15), as the case may
be. The popular case of dichotomous populations follow by taking m = 2 in the above.
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